Yesterday my colleague, the Mad Hathor, talked about a religious rights case out of California. While I'm pleased at the 9th Circuit's recent decision in Warsoldier v. Woodford, I feel compelled to correct some misleading statements in the cited article, lest people think this case has greater significance than it does.
The 9th Circuit decision did not, in fact, say that the prison had violated Warsoldier's rights by having a rule mandating that male prisoners' hair be no longer than three inches long. Instead, it said that Warsoldier had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success when the court (or jury) ultimately decided the issue.
Eh?
Warsoldier asked the District Court for a temporary injunction to prevent the prison from enforcing its rule as against him until the court had the opportunity to decide the case on its merits. (Important note: the prison never threatened to cut Warsoldier's hair without his consent; rather, it was imposing other punishments on him for his unwillingness to follow the prison's rules.)
To get such an injunction Warsoldier had to prove, among other things, that he was likely to succeed on the merits of his claim -- i.e., that the court would ultimately decide that the prison's rule violated his right to religious freedom under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"). The District Court held that, for various reasons, Warsoldier had not proved his entitlement to a temporary injunction. The 9th Circuit however, in part relying on Cutter v. Wilkinson, disagreed and issued the injunction.
This does not mean that the court held that the rule was invalid. It does not mean that the California prison system violated Warsoldier's rights. It only means that at this time, this three-judge panel of the court thinks that -- based upon the evidence put before it right now -- Warsoldier would likely succeed on his claim. The state could come up with additional evidence and ultimately prevail -- this decision isn't binding on a court's future finding. So yes, it's fine to open a bottle of champagne, but save the really good stuff for later.
The article also mentioned a prior case, from last year, in which the 9th Circuit held differently. Yes, that's absolutely true, because the plaintiff in that case relied upon a different legal theory, one that's far more lenient towards the state's policies ("legitimate penological interest" vs. "compelling interest" and "least restrictive means" of achieving goal, for those of you up on these things). It has no bearing on this case (or other cases brought under the RLUIPA) whatsoever.
You've just got to love bad legal reporting.
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